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On charges of murder or assault, it often appears that the 
accused's aggression was immediately preceded by provocative 
behaviour e.g. taunts or insults by the victim which induced 
anger or rage in the accused and which gave rise to his 
aggression. [l] The present study aims to address the question 
whether, in South African law, a defence is available to an 
accused in such cases. Since the issue of provocation in South 
African law usually ar~ses in homicide cases, this study will 
be restricted to such cases. 
It will be shown that, during the past couple of decades, the 
South African law relating to provocation has undergone 
significant development. In 1925, the Appellate Division [2] 
declared s 141 of the Native Territories Penal Code [3] to be 
an accurate reflection of the South African law relating to 
provocation. In terms of this section, provocation could 
operate as a partial defence on a charge of murder : where an 
accused successfully raised the defence he would be convicted 
of culpable homicide. Recently, however, it has become clear 
that provocation may operate as a complete defence, resulting 
in an accused leaving the court as a free person. [4] 
It will be argued that the above development reflects a general 
shift in our law, starting in the 1950's, from a policy-ba~ed 
to a principle-based approach to crimina 1 1 i abi 1 i ty. According 
1 
to Snyman [5], a policy-based or empirical approach is 
characterised by the tendency to think inductively i.e. to 
reach conclusions with reference to particular cas'~s or 
examples from the past rather than with the aid of general 
principles. This results in the creation of a body of loose 
and incoherent 'defences', 'justifications' and 'excuses'. The 
law is thus guided by considerations of common sense and public 
policy. 
In contrast to a policy-based approach, Snyman [6] identifies 
a principle-based or systematic approach to criminal 1 iabi l i ty. 
He argues that this approach is characterised by a systematic 
and analytical method of reasoning which tends to be deductive. 
This approach results in the emergence of a coherent system of 
1 egal principles rather than a collection of incidenta 1 and 
unconnected rules. 
As Holmes JA correctly stated in Mokonto [7], 
"(p)rovocation and anger are different concepts, just as 
cause and effect are." 
It wi 11 be shown that, in keeping with a principle-based 
approach to criminal liability, our courts now focus upon the 
effect of provocation. The centre of the inquiry has become 
the ways in which such anger or rage impact upon the elements 
of criminal 1 iabi 1 i ty rather than the provocative conduct 
itself. It may thus be more appropriate to describe the 
2 
subject of the present study as 'anger or rage'. Nevertheless, 
for the sake of convenience, the term provocation wi 11 be 
employed in the following discussion. 
For the purpose of this study a psycho! ogical theory of 
criminal liability will be adopted. In terms of this theory, 
the elements of criminal liability may be divided into two , 
groups viz the objective elements, which include the actus and 
unlawfulness, and the subjective elements which include 
imputabi 1i ty and mens rea. [ 8] Each of these substantive 
elements will be examined in order to assess the impact, if 
any, that provocation may have upon them. The relevance of 
provocation to mitigation or extenuation will not be 
considered. 
In contrast to the principle-based approach to provocation that 
has emerged in South African law, the English law relating to 
provocation is strongly policy-based. In terms of the latter 
approach a defence of provocation is only available on a charge 
of murder, and can operate only ~s a partial defence on such 
a charge by reducing it to vo 1 untary mans 1 aughter. [ 9] It, is 
submitted that, in the light of the divergence between the 
South African and the English law relating to provocation, a 
comparative analysis of these approaches will facilitate an 
assessment of our law on this issue. For this purpose the 
English law of provocation will be briefly set out, and some 
of the merits and derneri ts of the Eng 1 ish approach wi 11 be 
considered. 
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Finally, some of the policy considerations underlying the view 
that provocation ought not to operate as a complete defence 
will be considered briefly, as well as the question whether the 
interests of criminal justice are served by allowing a person 
who kills a provoker to escape punishment completely. 
4 
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PROVOCATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
2.1 An Overview of the Historical Development of the South 
African Law Relating to Provocation 
2 .1.1 Roman and Roman-Dutch Law 
According to De Wet and Swanepoel [10], Roman law recognised 
anger as ·a mitigating factor. These writers argue that, in 
Roman law, this issue was closely linked to the distinction 
' that was drawn for sentence purposes between 'premeditated' 
crimes and crimes committed 'on impulse'. The latter category 
of crimes was not considered to be as serious as that of 
'premeditated' crimes. Thus, for example, a man who killed his 
wife upon discovering her in the act of adultery was given a 
lighter punishment than that ordinarily prescribed for murder, 
since the aggressor's passion in such a situation was 
considered to,be extremely difficult to control. [11] 
De Wet and Swanepoel [ 12] submit that, of the Roman-Dutch 
writers, only Matthaeus and Van der Keessel comprehensively 
discussed the issue of provocation. According to Matthaeus, 
nature requires a person to control his passions and impulses. 
However, where a person committed a crime while in a 'fair' or 
'just' state of anger, that crime would be more 1 ight 1 y 
punished than a 'premeditated' crime. The views of Moorman and 
Van der Keessel on the issue of anger corresponded fairly 
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closely with those of Matthaeus. The' dominant view in Romari-
Dutch law was thus that anger could, at most, operate as a 
mitigating factor. 
2 .1. 2 South African Law 
Burchell and Hunt [13] argue that South African law might have 
followed the Roman and Roman-Dutch approach to provocation but 
for the fact that, until . 1935 when the extenuating 
circumstances rule was introduced [14], the death penalty was 
obligatory for murder. Provocation could thus not operate to 
mitigate sentence. 
' 
In 1925, the Appellate Division in S v Butelezi [15] declared 
s 141 (16] of the Native Territories Penal Code (17] to be an 
accurate reflection of the South African law relating to 
provocation. Snyman (18] summarises the requirements of this 
section as follows: 
a) the provocation must have consisted of a "wrongful 
act or insult" 
b) the provocation must have been of such a nature that 
the accused was deprived of his "power of self-
cont ro 1" 
c) the provocation must have been of such a nature that 
an "ordinary person" would have been deprived of the 
6 
"power of self-control" 
d) the accused's aggression must have immediately 
followed the provocation. 
Section 141, which was based upon English law (19], envisaged 
a type of partial excuse situation: where an accused who 
killed intentionally (20] successfully raised the defence, a 
conviction of culpable homicide would follow without the need 
for proof of negligence. By requiring the provocation to be 
sufficient. to deprive an "ordinary person" of the "power of 
self-control", an objective test of provocation was introduced 
into our law the question was not only whether the accused 
became angry, but whether a fictitious "ordinary person" also 
would have become angry. [21] 
The adoption of the provisions of s 141 by the Appel late 
Division in Butelezi, although followed in subsequent cases 
[ 2 2 J, has been severe! y criticised by some writers. Thus, 
Koyana [23] argues that it was wrong for the courts to take a 
section of statute that was specially designed for a particular 
area in order to meet condi ti ans prevai 1 ing within it, and 
declare it applicable to South Africa, for which it was never 
meant. He contends that, whereas it may be acceptable for the. 
legislature of one country to adopt the legislation of another, 
the courts ought not, wittingly or unwittingly, to take such 
a task upon themselves. 
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Following the decision in Butelezi, our courts grappled with 
the question whether the objective requirement of the 'ordinary 
person' embodied in s 141 was relevant to the test for 
provocation, or whether the test was merely whether, 
subjectively considered, the accused had the intention to kil 1. 
This question was finally settled in 1971 in S v Mokonto [24] 
where the Appellate Division held that s 141 of the Native 
Territories Penal Code was to be confined to the territory for 
which it was passed, and that provocation was relevant to the 
question whether, subjectively considered, the accused had the 
intention to kill. 
Provocation could not operate as a complete defence, however. 
Instead, our courts applied the English doctrine of specific 
intent according to which crimes could be divided into two 
groups: those requiring a specific intent and those requiring 
an ordinary intent. The view was held that provocation could 
negative the specific intent required for a conviction of 
murder, with the result that the accused would be convicted of 
the less serious crime of culpable homicide. [25] 
The Appellate Division decision in S v Chretien [26], which 
dealt with the issue of voluntary intoxication, had a 
significant impact on our law relating to provocation. In this 
case, the court endorsed a principle-based approach to criminal 
liability and held that, in exceptional cases, intoxication 
could lead to a lack of intention. It was also held obiter 
that intoxication could lead to a lack of voluntary conduct or 
8 
imputability. [27] Further, the Appellate Division rejected· 
the specific intent theory in connection with intoxication. 
, In Arnold [28] the Cape Provincial Division, on the authority 
of the decision in Chretien, held that provocation could have 
the effect of negating voluntary conduct. 
After the decision in Chretien, our courts began to recognise 
a general defence of non-imputability in terms of which even 
non-pathological factors such as anger or emotional stress 
could lead to a lack of imputability. Ins v Wiid (29], the 
Appellate Division acquitted the appellant on the basis of such 
a defence, thus finally establishing it in our law. 
2.2 The Effect of Provocation on an Actus 
It is accepted in our law that there can be no question of 
criminal liability without voluntary conduct. (30] Some 
uncertainty exists, however, regarding the content of the 
requirement of voluntariness. [ 31] 
In R v Dhlamini (32] the accused, who had just half-waked out 
of a nightmare, fatally stabbed a person sharing his hut. He. 
was acquitted on the basis of the court's finding that he had 
acted 
" ... mechanically without intention, volition or motive". 
(33] 
Visser and Vorster (34] submit that, although conduct need not 
be 'desired' in order to be voluntary, it must be subject to 
the control of the human will. Similarly, Snyman (35] argues 
that conduct wi 11 be voluntary where an accused is able to 
subject his bodily movements to the control of his wil 1 or 
intellect. 
A defence of involuntary or unconscious conduct is often 
described as automatism. South African law distinguishes 
between insane automatism (which stems from a mental illness 
or defect) and sane automatism (which may stem from factors 
such as sleep, hypnosis, a black-out or an epileptic fit). A 
successful defence of insane automatism results in the.accused 
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being detained as a State President's patient, whereas a 
successful defence of sane automatism results in an acquittal. 
[36] 
Obiter support for the view that provocation may negate the 
voluntariness of conduct can be found as early as 1949 in R v 
Thibani. [37] In that case Schreiner JA stated as follows: 
"Provocation (is) a special kind of material from which 
in association with the rest of the evidence, the 
decision must be reached whether or not the Crown has 
proved the intent, as well as the act, beyond reasonable 
doubt." [38] 
Although the above dictum was not explicitly rejected in 
subsequent cases, the proposition that the voluntariness of 
conduct might be negated by provocation was not considered by 
our courts until the 1980's. 
In 1981 in S v Chretien [39], the Appellate Division, per 
Rumpff CJ, stated obiter as follows: 
"In die strafreg is 'n handeling alleen dan 'n handeling 
wanneer dit deur die gees beheer word. In die geval van 
die onwi 11 ekeurige spierbewegings van 'n papdronke is 
daar geen sweem van beheer nie en is dit dus nie eers 
nodig om oar skuld te filosofeer _nie". [40] 
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The statements quoted above paved the way for the view that 
provocation, like intoxication, could render an accused's 
conduct involuntary. In 1983, the Supreme Court endorsed this 
view in S v Arnold (41]. The facts of this case are briefly 
sketched below. 
The accused was charged with murdering his wife. On the day 
of the fatal incident an argument erupted between the parties, 
during which the deceased threatened to leave the accused in 
order to pursue a career in strip-dancing. During the course 
of the argument the accused held a pistol, which he carried on 
account of his job, in his hand. One shot was accident 1 y 
fired, but missed the deceased. The argument continued an.d at 
the critical moment, according to the court, 
"the deceased bent forward displaying her bate breasts 
while she also referred to the strip-dancing. This was 
obviously an act of provocation on the part cf the 
deceased." (42] 
A second shot was fired, killing the deceased. According to 
the accused, he could not remember aiming the gun or pulling 
the trigger. 
The first question-addressed by the court was whether or not 
the accused performed "an act in the 1 egal sense". [ 43] 
Burger J re-affirmed the principle that conduct which is not 
voluntary or conscious carries no 1 egal significance, and 
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approvingly quoted the obiter statements by Rumpff CJ in 
Chretien as set out above. The court concluded that, taking 
into account all the eyidence as well as the accused's conduct 
in the witness box, it had not been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
"that when the accused killed the deceased he was acting 
consciously and not subconsciously" (44] 
and thus acquitted him. 
According to Ell is [ 45], an important factor which 1 ed the 
court to the above conclusion was its finding that not a single 
statement by the accused could be branded as untrue. El 1 is 
suggests that the court must have been strongly influenced by 
the fact that the state, unlike the defence, did not lead any 
psychiatric evidence, nor did it dispute the opinion expressed 
by Dr Gittelson, for the defence, that the accused may have 
acted subconsciously at the crucial time. 
Ellis [46] submits further that although the court in Arnold 
relied upon Chretien as authority for the proposition that 
there can be no criminal liability without voluntary conduct, 
the finding in Arnold that the accused did not commit an "act 
in the legal sense" is not supported by that case'. He argues 
that, whereas the court in Chretien held obiter that 
unconscious conduct would be involuntary, Arnold involved 
conduct that was merely subconscious. 
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According to El 1 is [ 47], a person acting subconsciously retains 
a degree of consciousness, whereas a person acting 
unconsciously does not. In his view, only unconscious conduct 
can be considered to be involuntary. He thus considers the 
finding of automatism in Arnold to be wrong. 
This judgement has also been criticised by Snyman. (48] 
Although he does not endeavour to dispute the court's finding 
that the accused was so overcome with emotion that he acted 
involuntarily, Snyman argues that the Court was incorrect in 
regarding the involuntary nature of the accused's conduct at 
the moment that he fired the fatal shot as a reason for finding 
him not guilty. He states that the requirement of voluntary 
conduct is subject to the following exception: 
"If on a charge of culpable homicide, the evidence shows 
that, prior to the involuntary conduct the accused. 
performed a voluntary act, that such voluntary act was 
causally related to the subsequent (fatal) involuntary 
conduct, and that the prior voluntary act was, under the 
circumstances, negligent in the sense that a reasonable 
man would have foreseen that such an act might result in 
the fatal occurrence, then the accused is not entitled to 
rely upon the involuntary nature of his conduct as a 
defence." (49] 
Snyman (50] argues convincingly that, although the court in 




accused acted consciously at the time when he fired the first 
shot, this could logically be inferred from the fact that the 
judgement contains a description of events that took place 
between the firing of the two shots, coupled with the fact that 
the accused must have been the only person who could have told 
the court what happened at this time. In Snyman 's view the 
relevant voluntary conduct was thus the failure of the accused, 
at the time when the first shot was fired, to get rid of the 
gun or to put it out of action. He argues that, in this 
respect, the accused was negligent since the 'reasonable man' 
would have taken steps to prevent the gun from going off a 
second time. He suggests that, on this footing, the accused 
should have been convicted of culpable homicide. 
Ellis [51] has similarly criticised the failure of the court 
in Arnold to consider a verdict of culpable homicide. He 
points out, however, that the principle of antecedent 1 iabi Ii ty 
outlined above does not constitute an exception to the rule' 
that involuntary conduct is not punishable, since antecedent 
liability follows from the application of the ordinary 
principles of criminal law. 
A defence of automatism was also raised in S v Smith [52], but 
was rejected by the court on the facts. 
in this case, the Appellate Division 
It is noteworthy that, 
did not reject the 
possibi 1 i ty that factors such as anger or emotional stress 
might, in certain circumstances, render an accused's conduct 
involuntary. It is thus submitted that the decision in Smith 
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is reconcilable with the ratio decidendi of Arnold. 
Bergenthuin (53] argues that provocation cannot have the effect 
of negativing voluntary conduct. He concedes that intoxication 
may have that effect but submits that, whereas intoxication may 
lead to a total lack of consciousness, provocation may only 
lead to a 'narrowing' of consciousness. 
In my view, the above argument cannot be supported. Strauss 
(54] argues cogently that extreme anger may affect an actor in 
such a way that he "does not know what he is doing". 
Although Strauss adopts the view that such a condition will \ 
negative imputability, Dean [55] points out that, in fact, such 
a condition wi 11 negative the voluntariness of conduct. Dean 
argues that provocation may also render an accused so blinded 
by rage that he has no control over his physical movements at 
all. In such cases the accused cannot be said to have acted 
voluntarily. 
' In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that our 
courts are prepared to accept that provocation may, in certain 
circumstances, operate as a complete defence by negativing the 
voluntariness of conduct. In my view, this approach is logical 
and systematic and is in keeping with a principle-based model 
of criminal liability. 
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2.3 The Effect of Provocation on Unlawfulness 
Snyman [56] points out that the criminal law does not prohibit 
conduct in abstracto but specific types of conduct committed 
in specific circumstances. Conduct which conflicts with such 
a prohibition may be described as prima facie unlawful. [57] 
A number of justification grounds have, however, become 
crystallised in our law. [58] In circumstances where such a 
justification ground is present, prima facie unlawful conduct 
is rendered lawful, so that no actual infringement of the legal 
prohibition in question will have occurred. [59] 
It is generally recognised that there is no numerus clausus of 
justification grounds. By applying the criteria of 'objective 
reasonableness' or the 'legal convictions of the community', 
our courts are prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to find 
that conduct was justified on the grounds of considerations 
other than those contained in the recognised and well-known 
grounds of justification. [60] In S v I [61] the accused had 
invaded the complainant's privacy with the aim of gathering 
evidence of adultery. The court held that, in the light of 
" ... the modes of thought prevai 1 ing in our community at 
this time, judged in accordance with what is in the 
public interest and in accordance with the Court's 
conception of contemporary boni mores", 
the accused's conduct was not unlawful. 
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It cannot be disputed that prima facie unlawful conduct of a 
provoked person may, in certain circumstances, be brought 
within the ambit of a recognised justification ground. For 
example, where an aggressor threatens a victim with immediate 
personal violence that threat, which may amount to provocation, 
may also constitute an unlawful threatening attack against 
which the provoked person may lawfully defend himself. [ 62] 
Bergenthuin [63] correctly points out, however, that reference 
to provocation in such cases will be unnecessary. 
It can be argued that, in certain circumstances, a prima facie 
within the ambit of a crystallised justification ground. 
Al though this argument has not yet been considered by our 
courts in the field of criminal law (64], it is supported by, 
inter alia, Bergenthuin [65], Dlamini [66 ] and Van Rooyen. 
[67] Dlamini correctly points out that to view provocation as 
a justification ground does not involve conflict with 
principle. 
Van Aswegen [68] argues that to view provocation as a 
justification ground would shift the focus of the inquiry from 
the subjective state of mind of the accused to the nature of 
the provocative conduct. The question would be whether, having 
regard to the degree of provocation and the response elicited 
by it, that response could be said to be objectively reasonable 
18 
and in proportion to the provocation. 
In my view, it is difficult to imagine provocation of such a 
nature as to be objectively proportional to the killing of the 
provoker. It is thus submitted that our courts are unlikely 
to accept the view that provocation may operate as a 
justification ground in homicide cases. (69] 
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2.4 The Effect of Provocation on Imputability 
Imputability [70] is an essential prerequisite for criminal 
liability. The test for imputability requires that, at the 
time of the alleged commission of an offence, the accused had 
the mental ability to distinguish between right and wrong as 
well as the capacity to act in accordance with that 
distinction. [71] 
Burchell and Hunt [72] as well as Snyman [73] adopt the view 
that imputability forms part of the mens rea requirement. I 
submit, however, that Visser and Vorster [74] are correct in 
stating that imputabil i ty is a separate element of every 
offence. Thus, the existence of imputabi 1 i ty has to be 
established before an investigation into mens rea becomes 
relevant. [75] This approach was endorsed by Viljoen JA and 
Boschoff AJA in Campher. [76] 
The question whether provocation may render an accused non-
imputable is closely linked with the question whether our law 
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~ecognises a genera) defence of non-imputabi 1 i ty. Such a 
general defence would mean that any factor, including 
provocation, which renders an accused incapable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong or of acting 
accordingly, will be judicially relevant. [77] Some recent 
judicial decisions wi 11 be analysed below, and it wi 11 be 
demonstrated that such a general defence of non-imputability 
has become established in our law. 
As early as 1959, Strauss [78] argued strongly in favour of the 
view that provocation may negate imputability. However, 
until recently this view was largely ignored. Our courts 
adopted the view that, apart from the common law presumptions 
relating to persons under the age of fourteen [79], the only 
defence of non-imputability in our law was set out ins 78 (1) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. [80] This section provides as 
follows: 
"A person who commits an act which constitutes on offence 
and who, at the time of such commission suffers from a 
mental illness or mental defect which makes him incapable 
(a) of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act; or 
(b) of acting in accordance with an appreciation of the 
wrongfulness of his act, 
shall not be criminally responsible for such act." 
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Where such a defence is successfully raised, an accused is 
found not guilty but is detained in a mental hospital or prison 
pending the signification of the State President. [81] 
/rn S v Chretien (82], however, the Appellate Division, per 
Rumpff CJ, adopted the following obiter view on the question 
of the impact of intoxication on the imputabil i ty of an 
accused: 
" ... wanneer 'n persoon, wat 'n gevolghandeling pleeg, so 
besope is dat hy nie besef nie dat wat hy doen 
ongeoorloof is, of dat sy inhibisies wesentlik verkrurnmel 
het, kan hy as ontoerekeningsvatbaar beskou word." [83] 
Al though the above statement blurs the distinction between 
imputability and intention [84], it was approvingly quoted by 
Diemont AJA in S v"van Vuuren. [85] In this case the appellant 
argued that, when he killed the deceased, he was non-imputable 
as a result of a combination of intoxication and provocation. 
Al though this defence f ai 1 ed on the facts of the case, the 
Appellate Division stated obiter that, where a combination of 
drink and other factors such as provocation and severe mental 
or emotional stress rendered an accused unable to comprehend 
what he was doing, he would not be criminally responsible. , The 
court adopted the view that, in such· cases, the critical 
question would be whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the conclusion that the accused failed to appreciate 
the unlawfulness of his act or that he failed to realise what 
21 
was happening. [86] 
In S v Lesch [87] the accused, who was charged with murdering 
his neighbour, argued that, at the time of the killing, he had 
been non-imputable on account of his extreme anger. He 
conceded that he had appreciated the wrongfulness of his 
conduct, but submitted that he had not been able to act in 
conformity with that appreciation. 
Hatting AJ tacitly assumed that a defence of non-imputability 
based upon extreme anger existed in our law and that, in 
appropriate circumstances, it could operate as a complete 
defence on a charge of murder, resulting in an accused leaving 
the court as a free person. The defence failed on the facts, 
however, since the court concluded that the behaviour of the 
accused at the crucial time had been too rational to support 
a finding that he had been unable to restrain himself from 
killing the deceased. [88] 
Further support in favour of a general 
imputability can be found in S v Arnold. 
defence of non-
(89] The court 
clearly adopted the view that there is no numerus clausus of 
factors which may negate imputability, and stated as follows: 
" ... it is not only youth, mental disorder or intoxication 
which could lead to a state of criminal incapacity, but 
also (incapacity caused by other factors such as extreme 
emotional stress" [90] 
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Although the above statement indicates a willingness on the 
part of the courts to recognise a general defence of non-
imputabi li ty, it is of persuasive value only, as Arnold was 
acquitted on the ground that his conduct, having been 
unconscious, did not constitute an act in the legal sense. (91] 
According to Snyman (92], the most important judgement which 
paved the way for the recognition of provocation as a complete 
defence was S v Campher. (93] In this case the appellant had 
been convicted of murdering her husband. 'At the time of the 
killing she had suffered under extreme emotional stress. On 
appeal, the question arose whether she was imputable at the 
time of the fatal incident. The appeal was considered by three 
Judges of Appeal, each of whom delivered a separate judgement. 
According to Viljoen JA, the decision in S v Chretien opened 
the door to the recognition of a defence of non-imputability 
even where the non-imputabi 1 i ty stemmed f ram a temporary mental 
aberration. The learned Judge of Appeal adopted the view that 
the appellant had laboured under an impulse which she could not 
resist, namely to destroy the "monster" - the deceased - that 
was threatening her. As a result, she had been unable to act 
in accordance with a distinction between right and wrong, and 
was thus not imputable at the time of the fatal incident. It 
is noteworthy that Vi 1 joen JA was prepared to make this finding 
despite the fact that no expert evidence regarding the 
appellant's mental condition when she killed the deceased had 
been led. Viljoen JA thus concluded that, since the 
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appellant's condition did not stem from a "mental illness or 
mental defe_ct" she was to be acquitted without being declared 
a State President's patient in terms of s 78 ( 6) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. (94] 
Du Plessis [95] submits that the above judgement may be summed 
up as follows: our law recognises both sane (or non-
pathological) non-imputability and insane (or pathological) 
non-imputability. Al though a defence based upon either of 
these conditions will result in an accused being acquitted, a 
defence based upon the latter condition will result in the 
accused's detention as a State President's patient. 
Boshof f AJA shared the view adopted by Vi 1 joen JA that a 
defence of non-imputability is not restricted to conditions 
stemming from a mental illness or defect, but includes cases 
where an accused suffers from a temporary mental aberration as 
a result of fear or emotional stress. However, Boshoff AJA 
adopted the view that such a defence could not succeed in the 
absence of expert evidence by clinical psychologists or 
psychiatrists. He concluded that, since such evidence had not 
been presented, the appeal could not succeed. 
Jacobs JA regarded the appellant's defence as one of 
'irresistible impulse'. He argued that such a defence only 
exists within the provisions of s 78 (1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and concluded that, since the appellant had not 
suffered from a mental illness or defect, the conviction of 
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murder had to be upheld. (96] 
The Campher judgement on the whole can be criticised on the 
ground that, although the appeal was dismissed by a majority 
of the court (Boshoff AJA and Jacobs JA), a majority (Viljoen 
JA and Boshoff AJA) adopted the view that a general defence of 
non-imputability exists in our law outside the provisions of 
s 78 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The ultimate decision 
is thus not based upon a majority view of the law. [97] 
In S v Laubscher [98], the Appellate Division again considered 
a defence based upon a lack of imputability. Joubert JA re-
' affirmed the principle that imputability is a pre-requisite for 
criminal liability and stated that: 
"Die erkende psigologiese kenmerke van toerekenings-
vatbaarheid is: 
1. Die vermoe om tussen reg en verkeerd te onderskei. 
Die dader het die onderskeidingsvermoe om die 
regmatigheid of onregmatigheid van sy handeling in 
te sien. Met ander woorde, hy het die vermoe om te 
besef dat hy wederregtelik optree. 
2. Die vermoe om ooreenkomstig daardie onderskeindings-
vermoe te handel deurdat hy die weerstandskrag 
(wilsbeheervermoe) het om die versoeking om 
wederregtelik te handel, te weerstaan. Met ander 




of onregmatig te handel, onderworpe aan sy wi 1." 
[99] 
Joubert JA raised the question whether a defence of non-
pathological non-imputability existed in our law but did not 
consider it necessary to decide this question, since the court 
found that the accused had been imputable at the relevant time. 
Although it is thus not entirely clear whether the court in 
Laubscher was of the view that such a defence exists in our 
law, it is noteworthy that Joubert JA repeatedly referred to 
the judgements of Viljoen JA and Boshoff AJA in Campher without 
implying that they could be wrong. Snyman [100] thus concludes 
that the judgement in Laubscher is compatible with the 
existence of a general defence of non-pathological non-
imputability. 
~s v Calitz [101] provides obiter support for the existence of 
a general defence of non-imputability. In this case the 
Appellate Division considered an appeal against a conviction 
of murder. The appel 1 ant argued that he had ki 11 ed · the 
deceased in a fit of anger and that, as a result, he had not 
been imputable. He conceded that he had been able to 
distinguish between right and wrong, but argued that he had 
lacked the capacity to act in accordance with that distinction. 
The Appellate Division, per Eksteen JA, approvingly quoted the 
description of the elements of imputability as set out by 
Joubert JA in Laubscher, and adopted the view that imputability 
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could be negatived by non-pathological factors of a temporary 
nature. [102] 
Regarding the question of psychiatric evidence, the court 
supported the view adopted in Laubscher that such evidenc~ was 
not a prerequisite for successful reliance upon a defence of 
non-pathological non-imputability, since a court would be 
capable of assessing whether, on the evidence before it, the 
defence had been proved. [103] 
The above findings are of persuasive value only, since the 
court found that the appellant had been imputable at the 
relevant time. One of the reasons advanced by the court for 
this finding was that the appellant's evidence reflected a fair 
degree of detail concerning the sequence of events surrounding 
the killing. In the court's view, this fact was incompatible 
with the appellant's allegation that he had lacked the capacity 
to act in accordance with a distinction between right and 
wrong. [104] 
A defence of non-pathological non-imputability was raised in 
S v Smith. (105] In an appeal against a conviction of murder, 
the appellant submitted that, as a result of an 'emotional 
storm' arising from humiliation and frustration, she had been 
unable to distinguish between right and wrong. [106] 
The court found that, in the light of the evidence before it, 
the _appellant was criminally responsible at the critical time. 
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It was thus not necessary to decide whether a non-pathological 
factor such as an 'emotional storm' could negative 
imputability. It may be noted, however, that there is no 
indication by the court that a defence of non-pathological non-
imputabili ty does not exist in our law. 
In S v Wiid (107] a defence of non-pathological non-
imputabi 1 i ty was successful 1 y raised for the first time, 
resulting in an acquittal. The appellant, who was charged with 
murdering her husband, had shot him during the course of a 
violent argument. She set out her defence as follows: 
"6 Toe ek oorl edene geskiet het, het ek as gevolg van 
verskeie faktore waarskynlik onbewustelik opgetree 
en nie besef dat my handeling wederregtelik is nie. 
7 Ek was ook nie in staat om enige beheer oor my 
gemelde handeling uit te oefen nie. Derhalwe was my 
handeling nie strafregtelik toerekenbaar nie. 
8 My ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid was tydelik van aard en 
is nie aan enige permanente of tydelike 
geestesongesteldheid of gebrek (soos in art 78 van 
die Strafproseswet bedoel) toe te skryf nie." (108] 
In my view, the above statement discloses three possible 
defences, viz that the appellant: 
1. acted unconsciously, and thus involuntarily; 
2. lacked an awareness of the unlawfulness of her 
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conduct~ and thus lacked intention; 
3. 1 acked the capacity to act in accordance with a 
distinction between right and wrong, and was thus 
not imputable. 
It may be that the appellant's allegation that she acted 
unconsciously as well as her allegation that she was not aware 
of the unlawfulness of her conduct were advanced in support of 
the proposition that she was not imputable. Such a position 
is untenable, however, since the question of imputability does 
not arise where an accused acts unconsciously. Al so, the 
question of intention only arises once it has been established 
that an accused was imputable. 
In any event, it seems that Goldstone AJA addressed only the 
defence of imputability. He approved the distinction adopted 
in Laubscher between the capacity to distinguish between right 
and wrong and the capacity to act in accordance with that 
distinction. Goldstone AJA also approved the view adopted in 
Laubscher that, where one or both of these capacities are 
absent, there can be no criminal liability. [109] 
Regarding the onus of proof where a defence of non-pathological 
non-imputabil i ty is raised, Goldstone JA approved the statement 
in Mahlinza [110] that the onus rests upon the state to rebut 
such a defence where the accused lays a foundation for the 
defence in the evidence. 
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The court concluded that, taking into account al 1 the evidence, 
a doubt existed whether the appel 1 ant was imputable at the time 
of the shooting. She was thus acquitted. 
It is noteworthy that, ·although the deceased' s conduct was 
clearly provocative, Goldstone AJA did not expressly refer to 
provocation. Instead, the deceased' s conduct was regarded 
merely as part of the factual situation to which the principles 
of criminal liability (including the requirement of 
imputability) were to be applied. Thus, a purely principle-
based approach to provocation was endorsed by the Appellate 
Division. 
In the light of the decision in Wiid, it is clear that a 
general defence of non-imputabili ty has been established in our 
law. Thus, even non-pathological factors such as provocation 
or emotional stress may negative imputability. Such non-
imputability constitutes a complete defence, and will lead to 
an acquittal. 
Academic opinion is divided on the question whether a defence 
of non-pathological non-imputability ought to be available to 
a person who engages in unlawful aggression against a provoker. 
On the one hand, there are writers who argue against allowing 
such a defence. These writers adopt the view that, in the 
interests of the community, a provoked person ought to control 
his emotions. On the other hand, there are writers who argue 
that criminal liability ought to be determined solely by the 
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application of the general_p_riJ1-9j.ples of criminal liability. 
Lauw [111] concedes that a number of arguments may be advanced 
in favour of the recognition of a general defence of non-
imputabi l i ty. He argues that such an approach is both logical 
and 'juridically pure'. He points out that the recognition of 
such a defence creates a new defence for mentally healthy 
persons. Also, the availability of such a general defence is 
defensible on the ground that, unlike voluntary intoxication, 
non-pathological non-imputability cannot be considered to be 
a manifestation of the will of an accused. 
Lauw [112] submits, however, that a general defence of non-
imputability ought not to be recognized. He argues that the 
primary aim of the law is not to serve science or logic. Thus, 
where a judge changes, extends or rejects a rule of law, he 
ought to be guided not merely by logic but by underlying 
politico-legal considerations. 
According to Lauw [113], the following politico-legal 
considerations are relevant to the present issue. It is 
expected of a normal person to control his passions and 
impulses. Furthermore, self-control ought to be maintained, 
even in the face of extreme piovocation or emotional st~ess. 
Also, the law ought to forbid acts of revenge. 
Louw [ 114] argues further that, by recognising a general 
defence of non-imputability, punishment loses its reformative 
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and deterrent funct_i_ons, since an emotionally unstable criminal 
is no longer required to learn how to control his passions and 
impulses. 
In my view, the above argument is unsound. 1 Lauw [115] concedes 
that a condition of non-pathological non-imputability cannot 
be considered to be a manifestation of the will of an accused. 
It thus follows that considerations of deterrence and reform 
will, in any event, be meaningless in the context of 
imputability since punishment can have neither a deterrent nor 
a reformative function where conduct stems from a condition 
that is not a manifestation of the accused's will. 
Du Plessis [116] similarly criticises the defence of non-
pathological non-imputability. He concedes that the 
recognition of such a defence is logically consistent but 
submits that it is socially unacceptable since it amounts to 
making the defence of insanity available to the sane without 
pl acing the onus of proof on the accused and without the 
accused being faced with the undesirable prospect of being 
treated as a State President's patient. 
In my view, the above criticism cannot be supported. Burchell 
and Hunt (117] point out that insanity is the only common-law 
exception to be general principle that the onus of proof rests 
upon the prosecution. The position adopted in Wi id on the 
question of the onus of proof is therefore in accordance with 
principle. Furthermore, since non-pathological non-
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imputability is not attributable to a mental illness, the 
accused does not represent a danger to society, and thus there 
1is no reason why he ought to be referred to an institution for 
the mentally ill. [118] 
Du Pl es sis [ 119] argues further that, since a successful 
defence of sane non-imputability results in an acquittal 
regardless of whether the crime in question requires dolus or 
culpa, such a defence narrows the ambit of the crime of 
culpable homicide. In my view, this argument loses sight of 
the fact that, by applying the ordinary principles of criminal 
law, a person who kills while in a condition of non-
pathological non-imputability may nevertheless be convicted of 
a crime which requires either dolus or culpa on the basis of 
antecedent liability. 
Snyman [120] argues strongly in favour of a defence of non-
pathological non-imputability. He submits that such a defence 
is based upon the principle that criminal liability can only 
follow where an accused is able to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct and to act in accordance with that distinction. 
Visser and Vorster [121] similarly support the recognition of 
a defence of non-pathological non-imputability. These writers 
submit, however, that such a defence places a heavy burden upon 
the courts to guard against potential abuse. For example, an 
accused who has no valid defence may raise the defence of non-
imputabi 1 i ty in a desperate bid to avoid 1 iabi 1 i ty. Visser and 
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Vor~ter [122] suggest that this concern may be addressed by 
requiring an accused to lay a proper and scientifically 
accepted foundation for his defence. In this regard it is 
noteworthy that in Wiid the Appellate Division held that such 
\ 
a foundation had to be laid by the accused in order for the 
defence to succeed. 
2.5 
,p{o;~ ' 
The Effect of Provocation on Mens Rea 
According to the psychol ogica 1 theory of criminal 1 iabil i ty 
which is accepted by South African courts [123], mens rea 
consists of an unlawful mental condition [124] which may 
manifest itself in the form of either dolus or culpa. Both 
dolus and culpa will be discussed below in order to assess the 
effect, if any, that provocation may have on them. 
2.5.1 Dolus 
As early as 1925, it was accepted by the Appellate Division in 
Butelezi [125] that provocation could lead to a lack of 
intention. However, this approach was based upon a 
misinterpretation of s 141 of the Native Terri tori es Penal 
Code. [126] Snyrnan [127] points out that this section 
presupposed that, in the circumstances in which it was applied, 
the accused in fact had the intention to murder. Nevertheless, 
the Appellate Division implicitly adopted the view thats 141 
embodied a test to determine whether or not intention was 
present. [ 128] 
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In terms of the above approach, the question was not merely 
whether the accused lacked the intention to murder, but also 
whether a fictitious 'ordinary person' would, as a result of 
provocation, have lacked intention. [129] Thus, an objective 
test of provocation was established in our law. Despite 
criticism by South African writers [130], this approach was 
followed in a number of subsequent cases. [131] 
In 1949, however, the first cracks in the objective approach 
to provocation appeared in R v Thibani. [132] In this case 
Schreiner JA stated obiter that provocation was not a defence 
but factual material from which it had to be determined whether 
or not the accused had acted intentional 1 y. [ 133] • This 
approach, which inclines towards a subjective approach to 
provocation, helped to loosen the grip which s 141 had on our 
law. [134] Furthermore, by rejecting the view of provocation 
as a matter governed by the mechanical rules of s 141, this 
decision represents a development towards a principle-based 
approach to criminal liability in terms of which provocation 
is merely an aid in determining the accused's state of mind at 
the crucial time. 
In R v Krull [135], however, Schreiner JA qualified the 
approach adopted in Thibani. The 1 earned Judge of Appeal 
adopted the view that, where provocation was combined with 
intoxication, both of these factors were to be considered 
together in deciding whether, subjectively, intention was 
present. However, Schreiner JA stated obiter that, where an 
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accused's state of mind resulted from mental abnormality short 
of legal insanity, or idiosyncrasies sµch ~shot-headedness or 
timidity, an objective test of provocation had to be applied. 
(136] 
The above approach has been criticised by Burchell and Hunt 
(137], who point out that it is inconsistent, as well as out 
of line with the approach adopted by Schreiner JA himself in 
Thibani. Furthermore, as Visser and Vorster (138] point out, 
the approach adopted in Krull would mean that an accused who 
is congenitally quick-tempered would be treated more severely 
than one who became voluntarily intoxicated. 
In S v Mokonto (139], the Appellate Division, per Holmes JA, 
stated as follows: 
"l. Sec. 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code should be 
confined to the territory for which is was passed. 
2. In crimes of which a specific intention is an 
element, the question of the existence of such 
intention is a subjective one, namely, what was 
going on in the mind of the accused. 
3. Provocation, inter alia, is relevant to the question 
of the existence of such intention. 
4. Provocation, subjectively considered, is also 
relevant to extenuation or mitigation." (140] 
The above views, however, are of obiter value only since, on 
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the facts of the case, the court found that the provocation, 
far from negativing an intention to kill, actually c~used it. 
The judgement in Mokonto, which was widely welcomed by South 
African writers (141], represents a principle-based approach 
to provocation to the extent that it rejected the application 
of s 141 in our law. A principle-based approach is. also 
reflected in the court's view that provocation is relevant to 
the question whether intention is present, and that the test 
in this regard is subjective. Snyman [142] correctly points 
out, however, that in the Mok onto judgement the ef feet of 
provocation on criminal liability was still considered to be 
limited to intention. Furthermore, the court in Mokonto still 
applied the specific intent theory. 
Strauss (143] argues that anger induced by provocation cannot 
have the ef feet of excluding intention on the part of an 
imputable person. He argues that such anger, instead of 
negating intention, is evidence of it. 
In my view, the above proposition cannot be supported. In~ 
v De Blom [144] the Appellate Division unequivocally endorsed 
the view the knowledge on the part of an accused that his 
conduct is unlawful is an essential element of intention. 
According to De Wet and Swanepoel [145] this decision has been 
accepted without criticism in our case law. In my view, it is 
not inconceivable that an accused may become so angry as a 
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of the unlawfulness of his conduct. As Dlamini (146] points 
/ out, such a situation may arise where a provoked person cornmi ts 
an unlawful act while subjectively, albeit mistakenly, 
believing that he is acting upon a ground of justification. 
~i\Jl;. Such a mistake, however unreasonable, will exclude intention. 
/ 
Snyman [147] points to a further way in which provocation may 
impact upon intention. He argues that, since murder is a 
materially defined crime which is defined in terms of · the 
causing of death, an accused must have foreseen the 
consequences of his act - viz the victim's death - in order to 
be convicted of murder. Where the provocation is of such a 
nature that the accused does not foresee the victim's death, 
he cannot be said to have acted intentionally. 
The Appellate Division in S v Goosen [148] has recently held 
' that, on charges of murder, intention in the farm of dol us 
eventual is is not present in cases where the perpetrator's 
conception of the causal chain leading to the victim's death 
differs markedly from the actual causal chain. In my view, it 
is not inconceivable that such a misconception as to the causal 
link may arise as a result of anger or emotional stress induced 
by provocation. In such cases there will be no intention. 
Visser and Vorster (149] concede that provocation may have the 
effect of negating intention. They submit, however, that 
provocation will seldom have this effect. 
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The question arises whether, in the light of the principle-
based approach to provocation that is now being followed in our 
law, the concept of 'loss of self-control' is still relevant 
to the issue of provocation. This question wi 11 be brief 1 y 
considered below. 
Burchell and Hunt [150] state that 
"(p)rovocation will only avail as a defence to criminal 
liability if it resulted in a loss of self-control to 
such an extent as to negative the requisite intention for 
the crime charged." 
These writers thus adopt the view that 'loss of self-control' 
negates intention. 
According to Visser and Vorster [151], provocation may cause 
a person to become so angry that he 
'' ... loses all self-control and becomes so blind with rage 
that he cannot distinguish between right and wrong or act 
in accordance with such distinction. In such a 
case ... the accused will not be criminally accountable." 
In the light of the above statement it seems that Visser and 
Vorster do not consider 'loss of self-control' to be an 
essential, independent prerequisite for a defence of 
provocation. Rather, these writers seem to adopt the view that 
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'loss of self-control' is indicative of a lack of imputability 
on the part of a provoked person. 
A similar approach is followed by Burchell and Milton. [152] 
These writers employ the term '1 ass of sel £-control' in the 
context of provocation, but do not clearly set out the meaning 
of this term. However, since the textbook by these writers 
deals with the issue of provocation under the heading 
'Capacity' it may be that, in their view, 'loss of self-
control' can be equated with a lack of imputability. 
Snyman [153] supports the view that 'loss of self-control' can 
be equated with a lack of imputability, more specifically an 
absence of conati ve capacity i.e. the capacity to act in 
accordance with a distinction between right and wrong. Snyman 
argues cogent 1 y, however, that the concept '1 oss of sel £-
control' is only appropriate in a legal system such as that of 
England where the concept of imputability is not recognised. 
It is submitted that the concept 'loss of self-control' is no 
1 onger relevant to the issue of provocation in our 1 aw. 
Although this concept has not yet been expressly rejected by 
our courts (154], it is noteworthy that it does not appear in 
Arnold, Smith, Calitz or Wiid. It is thus submitted that, 
al though there may be some similarity between a 1 ack of, 
conative capacity and 'loss of self-control', the use of the 
latter term ought to be avoided in our law since it merely 
cl cuds the issue of provocation without serving any real 
40 
purpose in the inquiry into the liability of an accused. 
2.5.2 Culpa 
Prior to 1981, a conviction of culpable homicide automatically 
resulted where a defence of provocation was successfully 
raised. This approach flowed from the provisions of s 141 of 
the Native Territories Penal Code and from the application of 
the doctrine of specific intent. In Chretien, however, Rumpff 
CJ stated as follows: 
"Wat ans reg betref, behoort die hele idee van 'specific 
intent' in verband met drank, socs dit in die Engelse reg 
verskyn, as onaanvaarbaar beskou te word." (155] 
Al though the above statement refers only to intoxication, 
Snyman [156] questions whether there is any valid reason why 
the specific intent theory should be rejected for the purposes 
of the defence of intoxication but not for the purposes of the 
defence of provocation. In my view, this question must be 
answered in the negative. Thus, where an accused is charged 
with murder and it is found that, as a result of provocation, 
he lacked intention, a conviction of culpable homicide will 
only follow upon proof of negligence. (157] 
In South African law, culpa or negligence is determined with 
reference to the concept of the 'reasonable man' . In R v 
Heiring [158] the Appellate Division stated that 
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"(n)egligence can never be disentangled from the facts, 
but its existence is best ascertained by applying to the 
facts of each case the standard of conduct which the law 
requires. And that standard is the degree of care and 
skill which a reasonable man would exercise under the 
circumstances. "[159] 
In homicide cases involving provocation the test of negligence -
is linked to two central questions: 
a) Would the reasonable man have foreseen the 
possibility of death ensuing from a failure to curb 
his emotions? 
b) Would the reasonable man have taken steps to guard 
against that possibility? 
Where both of these questions are answered in the affirmative, 
negligence will be attributed to an accused who fails to 
foresee the possibility of the victim's death, or who foresees 
that possibi 1 i ty but does not take those steps which the 
'reasonable man' would have taken to guard against it. [160] 
In South African law, the standard of the 'reasonable man' is 
essentially objective i.e. no account is taken of the personal 
character is ti cs of an accused. [ 161] Thus, the educational 
level, intelligence, experience, knowledge or disabilities of 
an accused are ignored for the purpose of the 'reasonable man' 
test. [162] The test does contain subjective elements, 
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however. The question is how the 'reasonable man' would have 
behaved in the circumstances in which the accused found 
himself. (163] 
According to Bergenthuin (164], it is not inconceivable that 
the 'reasonable man' may react violently to provocation. He 
argues that the 'reasonable man' is not a superior being,· ·but 
is capable of experiencing emotions such as love, jealousy and 
disappointment. Bergenthuin i 11 ustrates this argument by 
pointing out that even the Biblical' character Moses became 
angry and destroyed the tablets of stone upon which the Ten 
Commandments were written. 
Snyman (165], on the other hand, adopts the view that it is 
highly improbable that the 'reasonable man' will ever lose his 
temper. He thus contends that, in practically all cases of 
provocation where an accused charged with murder succeeds in 
proving that he lacked dolus, he will be convicted of culpable 
homicide. 
It is submitted that Snyman's view on the present issue is 
compelling. In the light of the objective test of negligence 
applied in our law, characteristics such as hot-headedness or 
a volatile temperament are disregarded for the purpose of the 
'reasonable man' test. As Holmes JA stated in Burger [166], 
the reasonable man 
" ... treads life's pathway with moderation and common 
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sense." 
In my view, the killing of another while in a state of anger 
cannot be reconciled with moderation and.common sense. 
Heyns [167] argues that the 'reasonable man' test applied by 
our courts reflects Western standards, and quotes the following 
statement by Holmes JA in Mokonto [168] in support of this 
argument: 
"(T)he common law of South Africa in regard to murder and 
self-defence reflects the thinking of Western 
civilisation. Hence ... belief in the blight of witchcraft 
cannot be regarded as reasonable. To hold otherwise 
would be to plunge the law backward into the Dark Ages." 
Heyns [169] submits that the adoption of such a standard in a 
divided and heterogenous society such as exists in South Africa 
wi 11 result in the alienation of a 1 arge section of the 
community from the legal system. 
Whiting (170] similarly criticises the essentially objective 
test of negligence applied in our law. He argues that, in 
certain circumstances, this test may lead to a person being 
held criminally liable without there having been 
blameworthiness on his part. In his view, this test makes no 
allowance for the widely differing circumstances and mores of 
the various South African communities. Instead, it requires 
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everyone, whether they are rural tribesmen or city dwellers, 
to observe the same standard. Whiting i 11 ustrates this 
argument as follows: where a young black man who believes in 
witchcraft makes a mistake of fact which he would not have made 
· but for his belief, his mistake wil 1 be judged to be 
unreasonable (and therefore negligent) since the reasonable 
man, being free of such beliefs, would net have made such a 
mistake. 
In Attornev-General, Natal v Ndlovu 
Division has recently recognised the 
[171], the Appellate 
shortcomings of the 
'reasonable man' test. In this case the court recognised that, 
,because of the heterogeneity of South Africa's population and 
the widely differing levels of education and development that 
prevail within it, the application of the traditional test of, 
the 'reasonable man' may sometimes lead to unfairness and 
injustice . [ 172 ] 
In an attempt to address the shortcomings of the objective test 
of negligence, some writers have proposed a subjective test. 
Whiting [173] submits that the traditional, inflexible standard 
of the 'reasonable man' should be replaced with an 
individualised standard of proper care. An accused would then 
be judged by the standard of what could fairly and reasonably 
have been expected of him personally. Such an approach would 
take into account the knowledge, experience and capacities of 
the accused in determining whether his conduct was negligent. 
45 
It is submitted that, although the above test may be more 
acceptable than a purely objective test of negligence, its 
implementation will be problematic since it retains reference 
to the concepts of 'fairness' and 'reasonableness'. Although 
a more subjective approach to these concepts is advocated by 
Whiting, it is not clear to what extent the test will be 
subjectivised. For example, an intoxicated person who kills 
a provoker might believe that he is acting in self-defence. 
Can the accused's intoxication then be taken into account in 
determining whether he was negligent? 
De Wet and Swanepoel (174] appear to discard the 'reasonable 
man' test entirely, and suggest that the test of negligence 
should involve the following question: 
" die vraag is dus of hierdie besondere beskuldigde in 
hierdie gegewe omstandighede te kort geskiet het in die 
inspanning van sy geesteskragte om die feit wat horn ten 
laste gele word, te vermy" 
In terms of this approach, negligence .is seen as a failure to 
make the best use of one's mental powers so as to avoid the 
commission of a wrong. (175] The hot-headedness or volatile 
temperament of an accused would thus be relevant to the issue 
of negligence. 
Dean (176] argues that the above test merely gives more content 
to the standard against which an accused's conduct will be 
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evaluated in order to assess whether or not he was negligent. 
In his view, this standard will be that of a man with the same 
mental make-up of the accused but who makes full use of the 
mental capabilities at his disposal. He argues that the above 
standard would be just as hypothetical as that of the 
'reasonable man'. 
An argument that is commonly raised against the introduction 
of an individualised test of negligence is that such a test, 
by merging the standard of evaluation with the conduct to be 
evaluated, renders evaluation impossible. (177] In my view 
this argument fails to recognise that an individualised 
standard such as the one proposed by De Wet and Swanepoel does 
not assess an accused against the norms of his own behaviour, 
but against the standard that he could have attained, given his 
mental capabilities. 
A further argument which could be raised against the adoption 
of an individualised test of negligence is that the courts may 
experience difficulty in inquiring into some of the subjective 
questions with which its application would be concerned. [178] 
In my view, however, the merits of -~~--~~di vi dual ised test of '-.,:1{r ~ 
negligence outweigh this diffic~l:_!y. ~ 
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2.6 A Synopsis of the South African Law Relating to 
Provocation 
I In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that 
a principle-based approach to provocation has been established 
in our law. Our courts have rejected the view that provocation 
constitutes a separate doctrine, governed by its own set of 
rules, and now recognise that provocation constitutes factual 
material to which the ordinary principles of criminal 1 iabi l i ty 
are to be applied. The relevance of provocation to the 
elements of liability is briefly summarised below. 
S v Arnold (179] is authority for the view that provocation may 
have the effect of rendering an accused's conduct involuntary. 
In such cases the accused will be acquitted. 
In principle, there is no reason why our courts may not in 
future consider prima facie unlawful conduct to be justified 
by provocation. It has been submitted, however, that it is 
highly unlikely that a provoked homicide will ever be 
considered to be justified. 
The Appellate Division in S vWiid (180] has recently confirmed 
the existence of a general defence of non-imputability in our 
law. Where provocation has the effect of rendering an accused 
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong or of 




Provocation may negative intention, in which case an accused 
cannot be convicted of murder. The test of intention is purely 
subjective. Since the decision in Chretien (181], the doctrine 
of specific intent no 1 anger forms part of our 1 aw. Thus, 
where intenti~n is negatived by provocation, negligence must 
be proved for a conviction of culpable homicide. It has been 
submitted that, in the light of the objective test of 
negligence applied by our courts, it is unlikely that a 
provoked homicide will ever be considered to be reasonable. 
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3 
PROVOCATION IN ENGLISH LAW 
3.1 The Common Law Relating to Provocation 
During the seventeenth century the doctrine of provocation 
emerged in England as a partial defence which operated to 
reduce a killing, which would otherwise have been murder, to 
manslaughter. (182] According to Ashworth (183], this 
devel.opment took pl ace within a rigidly structured 1 aw of 
homicide. Killings were presumed to have been committed with 
malice aforethought. Where there was no evidence of exp~ess 
' 
malice, the law would imply malice. It came to be accepted 
that provocation could negate the element of malice that was 
required for a conviction of murder, the view being held that 
such evidence showed that the cause of the killing lay in the 
provocative conduct of the deceased rather than in some secret 
hatred on the part of the defendant. 
In applying the doctrine of provocation, the courts 
distinguished a number of categories of provocation which were 
considered to be 'sufficient' to rebut the presumption- of 
malice in homicide cases. In R v Mawgridge (184], Lord Holt 
CJ set out the following such categories: 
a) angry words followed by a physical assault 
b) the sight of a friend or relative being assaulted 
c) the sight of a citizen being unlawfully deprived of 
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his liberty 
d) the sight of a wife trapped in adultery 
It is noteworthy that, at common law, words unaccompanied by 
physical violence were not considered to be 'sufficient' 
provocation to reduce a ki 11 ing to voluntary mans 1 aughter. 
[185] 
In order for a defence of provocation to succeed, there had to 
be an actual, s·udden and temporary 'loss of self-control'. 
[186] This implied a causal relationship between the 
provocation and the killing i.e. the defendant must have killed 
because he was provoked, and not merely because provocation 
existed. [187] Furthermore, it was held that there could be 
no '1 oss of sel £-control' where the defendant had time to 
ref 1 ect upon the provoca·ti on before ki 11 ing the victim, or 
where the killing was committed in revenge. [188] 
According to· Ashworth [189], the categories of 'sufficient' 
provocation outlined above had never been regarded as fixed for 
all time, and gradually the English courts abandoned the view 
that any physical assault was in law sufficient provocation. 
The question then became one of the relative severity of an 
assault. The standard of the 'reasonable man' emerged during 
the nineteenth century as the embodiment of _the degree of 
seriousness of the provocation that was required for the 
defence. Smith and Hogan [190] argue that the concept of the 
reasonable man in the sphere of provocation first made its 
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appearance in Welsh [191] where Keating J expressed the concept 
as follows: 
"What I am bound to tel 1 you is, that in 1 aw it is 
necessary that there should have been a serious 
provocation in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter, 
as, for instance, a blow, and a severe blow - something 
which might naturally cause an ordinary and reasonable-
minded person to lose his self-control and commit such an 
act." [192] 
Painter [ 193] cites a number of cases which show that, at 
common law, the courts generally adopted a fairly inflexible 
approach to the 'reasonable man' test by not allowing account 
to be taken of the accused's own physical and mental 
constitution. Thus, neither mental deficiency, pregnancy nor 
drunkenness were considered to be relevant to the reasonable 
man test . [ 19 4] 
The above approach reached its zenith in Bedder v DPP [195]. 
The accused, who was sexual 1 y impotent, was charged with 
murdering a prostitute who had taunted him about his failure 
to have intercourse with her. The House of Lords refused to 
recognise the accused's impotence as a characteristic which 
could be taken into account in determining whether the 
prostitute's conduct amounted to such provocation as would 
cause a reasonable person to lose his self-control. Instead, 
it approved the following statement by the trial judge: 
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" ... an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual, or 
a drunken one or a man who is sexually impotent is not 
entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led 
an ordinary person to have acted in the way which was in 
fact carried out." [196] 
The decision in Bedder has been described as absurd, since the 
jury were directed to assess the effect of the prostitute's 
taunts on the defendant by assessing the effect that such 
\ 
taunts would have on a person who was not impotent. [197] 
Similarly, Ashworth [198] submits that the decision made bad 
law, since it is impossible to assess the gravity of 
provocation without reference to the characteristics of· the 
accused at whom the taunts were directed. 
The rigid and inflexible approach to the reasonable man test 
which existed at common law was significantly qualified by S 
3 of the Homicide Act. 
3.2 Section 3 of the Homicide Act 
In 1957 the British Parliament enacted the Homicide Act. The 
material provisions of section 3 of this Act provide as 
follows: 
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which 
the jury can find that the person charged was provoked 
(whether by things done or by things said or both 
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together) to lose his self-control, the question whether 
the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as 
he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and 
in determining that question the jury shall take into 
account everything both done and said according 'to the 
effect which, in their opinion it would have on a 
reasonable man." 
English [199] points out that the above section does not 
provide an exhaustive statement of the law of provocation. 
Thus, provocation continues to be a defence at common 1 aw, 
although significantly modified by section 3. This section 
modified the common law in two important ways: 
a) It abolished all previous rules as to what could or 
could not amount to provocation, including the rule 
that words unaccompanied by violence could not 
amount to provocation. 
b) It provides that if there is any ~vidence that the 
accused, at the time of the killing, lost his self-
control, the judge is bound to leave to the jury the 
question whether a 'reasonable man' would have 
responded to the provocation as the accused did. 
Section 3 creates a test which leaves two questions for the 
jury to consider: 
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(a) whether the defendant actually lost his self-control as 
a result of provocation (the subjective question), and 
(b) whether a 'reasonable man' would have been provoked to 
lose his self-control and act as the defendant did. [200] 
Each of these questions will be discussed below. 
3.2.1 The Subjective Question 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act has preserved the common law 
requirement that the defendant must actually have lost his 
sel £-control. In addressing this question, a number of factors 
may be taken into account, including the manner in which the 
victim's death was brought about, the length of time between 
the provocation and the ki 11 ing, and al 1 the other 
circumstances tending to show the state of mind of the 
defendant. [ 201] 
According to Wi 11 iams [ 202], the essence of the subjective 
question lies in the requirement that there must be a causal 
relationship between the provocation and the killing. 
Williams argues, however, that the concept of 'loss of self-
control' is useless and misleading. He states as follows: 
"And what is the point of saying that killing in the heat 
of anger involves loss of self-control? One who kills in 
a rage does what he wants to do in those circumstances, 
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just as much as the calculating robber does." (203] 
3.2.2 The Objective Question 
The 'reasonable man' test which emerged at common law has been 
preserved bys 3 of the Homicide Act. The following discussion 
will illustrate some of the dilemmas facing the English courts 
in the application of this test. 
Clarkson and Keating [204] point out that the question of 'what 
the reasonable man looks like' i.e. what characteristics of the 
defendant he may be said to possess, has long perplexed the 
judiciary. It will be demonstrated below that the standard of 
the 'reasonable man' test has become increasingly 
individualised, with the result that the courts are prepared 
to incorporate a number of subjective factors into the concept 
of the 'reasonable man'. 
In DPP v Camplin (205] the inflexible approach which was 
followed in common law regarding the characteristics which the 
'reasonable man'· could acquire was qualified. The accused, who 
was fifteen years old, kil 1 ed a middle-aged man after the 
latter had performed a homosexual act with him against his will 
and had then laughed at him. 
The question which the court had to address was whether the 
degree of self-control to be expected of the accused was that 
of a reasonable adult, or that of a reasonable boy of the same 
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infirmity ... " [206], 
young shoulders is 
compassion of human 
and concluded that the accused's conduct ought to have been 
evaluated against the standard of an ordinary boy of the same 
age as himself. Lord Diplock, speaking with the concurrence 
of the other Lords on this particular point, proceeded to 
describe the 'reasonable man' as follows: 
"a person having the power of self-control to be expected 
of an ordinary person of the same sex and age of the 
accused, but in other respects sharing such of the 
accused's characteristics as they think would affect the 
gravity of the provocation." [207] 
On the question of whether the age of an accused is relevant 
to the degree of sel £-control, the House of Lords confirmed the 
view adopted by the Court of Appeal in Cam~lin that nothing 
could be more ordinary or normal than to be aged fifteen. It 
is thus arguable that the ratio decidendi of Camplin is not in 
conflict with the statement in Bedder that any unusual physical 
characteristics of an accused must be .ignored. 
Williams (208], however, questions the logic of holding the age 
of an accused to be relevant to the question of what degree of 
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self-control is expected of him. He argues that self-control 
should be acquired contemporaneously with the acquisition of 
the physical power to kill. He concedes, however, that the 
approach adopted in Campl in works in the direction of 1 eniency. 
Williams [209] argues further that the view expressed in 
Camplin that the sex of an accused is relevant to the degree 
of sel £-control expected of him, cannot be supported. He 
submits that such a view would operate to the disadvantage of 
women since, if it is accepted that women, viewed in the 
abstract, are less likely than men to yield to an impulse of 
violence, then a women who yields to such an impulse would be 
more blameworthy than a man. 
Regarding the other 'characteristics'· which, according to 
Camplin, the 'reasonable man' might acquire, Lord Diplock's 
view revised the proposition stated in Bedder that any unusual 
physical characteristics of the accused are irrelevant in 
determining the degree of self-control to be expected of the 
accused. 
Lord Diplock pointed out that one of the important changes 
brought about bys 3 of the Homicide Act was the abolition of 
al 1 previous rules as to what could or· could not amount to 
provocation, including the rule that words unaccompanied by 
violence could not amount to sufficient provocation. He argued 
that the effect of this change was to mitigate in some degree 
the harshness of the common law of provocation, and that this 
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mitigatory effect would be stultified by excluding all th6~e 
factors which would affect the gravity of taunts and insults 
when applied to the person to whom they were addressed. Lord 
Diplock thus stated that: 
" ( t) o taunt a person because of his race, his physical 
infirmities or some shameful incident in his past may 
well be considered by the jury to be more offensive to 
the person addressed, however equable his temperament, if 
the facts on which the taunts are founded are true than 
it would be if they were not." (210] 
In my view, the above statement is correct. As Clarkson and 
Kea ting [ 211] point out, some insults wi 11 be meaning 1 ess 
unless the racial and cultural background is taken into 
account. The following example given by Lord Simon in Camplin 
illustrates this point: the term 'dirty nigger' would mean 
little if said to a white man, but would be quite insulting 
when said by a white man to a coloured man. (212] 
The judgement in Camplin thus seems to distinguish between 
characteristics such as age and sex which are assumed always 
to be relevant to an analysis of the 'reasonable man', and 
characteristics such as race and physical infirmities which 
will only be relevant where a provocative taunt or insult 
relates directly to such a characteristic. Although the basis 
for this distinction does not clearly appear from the 
judgement, some writers suggest that the first mentioned 
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characteristics are universal ones whereas the second group are 
peculiar to the individual accused. [213] 
In my view, the above distinction is unworkable. Lord Simon 
in Camplin suggests that characteristics such as pregnancy 
could be included in the description of the 'reasonable man'. 
[214] It is not clear whether such a characteristic is to be 
regarded as uni versa! or as 
observation also applies 
menstruation and menopause. 
peculiar to the accused. This 
in respect of homosexuality, 
It is noteworthy that · the House of Lords in Campl in was 
determined not to allow an accused to rely upon 
" ... his exceptional excitability (whether idiosyncratic 
or by cultural environment or ethnic origin) or pugnacity 
to ill-temper or drunkenness." [215] 
Thus, the above-mentioned 'characteristics' cannot be grafted 
onto the 'ordinary person' for the purpose of determining 
whether that notional individual would have reacted as the 
accused did. [216] According to Wil Iiams [217], this approach 
is rooted in the idea that a member of an excitable race ought 
not to be judged by a more generous standard than that 
pertaining to a more phlegmatic race~ 
In Newell [218], the Court of Appeal qualified the somewhat 
individualised approach to the 'reasonable man' followed in 
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Camplin by adopting a restricted interpretation of the term 
'characteristics'. The defendant, a chronic alcoholic, killed 
a friend who made disparaging remarks about his girlfriend. 
Lord Lane approvingly quoted the following statement from the 
New Zealand decision of McGreggor (219]: 
"It is not every trait or characteristic of the offender 
that can be invoked to modify the concept of the ordinary 
man. The characteristic must be something definite and 
of sufficient significance to make the offender a 
different person from the ordinary run of mankind, and 
have also a sufficient degree of permanence to warrant 
its being regarded as something constituting part of the 
individual's character or personality." [220] 
The court adopted the view that the defendant's alcoholism, his 
grief at the defection of his girlfriend as well as his state 
of confusion following a drug overdose were of a transitory 
nature and could thus not be considered as 'characteristics'. 
These factors were thus held to be irrelevant to the question 
whether the 'reasonable man' would have lost his self-control. 
Hodgson (221] concedes that the term 'characteristics' cannot 
be interpreted to include the matters advanced by the defendant 
in Newell in support of his defence. She argues, however, that 
it does not accord with the realities of emotional experience 
giving rise to provocation to maintain that words, which would 
otherwise be capable of leading to a loss of self-control, 
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cannot amount to provocation if the circumstance which caused 
the accused to react to them as he did was of a temporary or 
transient nature. 
Lord Lane in Newell also approved the requirement set out in 
McGreggor that, in order for a characteristic to be relevant 
to an analysis of the 'reasonable man', there must be a real 
connection between the nature of the provocation and that 
characteristic. To this extent, the approach adopted in 
Camplin was thus re-affirmed. In line with this approach, Lord 
Lane also approved the following statement in McGreggor: 
"In our opinion it is not enough to constitute a 
characteristic that the offender should merely in some 
general way be mentally deficient or weak-minded." [222] 
However, in Raven [223] the above dictum was not applied. In 
that case, the defendant who had a physical age of twenty two, 
had a mental ag& of nine. No direct connection existed between 
the provocation and the defendant's mental deficiency. 
Nevertheless, the jury was directed to judge the defendant with 
reference to a 'reasonable man' who had the mental age of the 
defendant. 
Williams [224] suggests that the ruling in Raven may perhaps 
be justified as an extension to 'mental age' of the Camplin 
rule for ordinary age. He also points out, however, that the 
concept of 'mental age' is only a convenient expression for 
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performance in an in tel 1 igence test, and is not normal I y 
regarded ih law or in psych~logy as a substitute for actual· 
age. 
Clarkson and Keating [225] suggest that the authority of the 
decision in Raven must be in doubt, considering the gloss put 
upon Camplin in Newell. They argue that, although the justice 
of the decision in Raven is beyond question, it makes 
substantial inroads into the notion of the 'reasonable man'. 
Whereas these writers are prepared to accept that the 
'reasonable man' may be aged fifteen, they question whether the 
'reasonable man' may ever be mentally deficient. 
It is arguable that the above cases illustrate the failure of 
the 'reasonable man' test to determine who ought to be 
punished and who ought in part, at least, to be excused. 
Clarkson and Keating [226] argue that this test has in itself 
become so concretised and glorified that the real question, viz 
whether ,the defendant could be expected to control the impulse 
to kill, has been lost from sight. 
The 'reasonable man' requirement in the sphere of provocation 
has been subjected to a torrent of academic criticism. Thus, 
it is argued that the 'reasonable man' requirement requires an 
almost impossibly high standard of conduct. [ 227] Hodgson [ 228] 
submiti that the 'reasonable man' is a figment of the judicial 
imagination and is hopelessly out of touch with the realities 
of life. Williams (229] questions whether the "paragon of 
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virtue", the 'reasonable man', 
provocation. 
can ever give way to 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee has recommended a number 
of changes to the test for provocation as set out ins 3 of the 
Homicide Act. They recommend that: 
" ... the law of provocation should be reformulated and in· 
place of the reasonable man test the test should be that 
provocation is a defence to a charge of murder if, on the 
facts as they appeared to the defendant, it can 
reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for the 
loss of self-control leaving the defendant to react 
against the victim with a murderous intention. This 
formulation has some advantage over the present law in 
that it avoids reference to the entirely notional 
'reasonable man' directing the jury's attention to what 
they themselves consider reasonable - which has always 
been the real question. 
(We) recommend that the defendant should be judged with 
due regard to al 1 the circumstances, including any 
disability, physical or mental, from which he suffered." 
[230] 
Painter (231] points out that the test embodied in the above 
recommendations is more liberal than the present law. 




recommendations do not expressly require a 'real connection' 
between the characteristics of the accused and the provocation, 
as is presently insisted upon by the courts, and thus represent 
a radical subjectivisation of the evaluative requirement. In 
fact, the recommendations refer to circumstances rather than 
characteristics. It can thus be argued that even fa9tors of 
the kind that were excluded from consideration in Newell may, 
in terms of the recommended approach, be taken into account in 
assessing whether the accused's 1 oss of self-control was 
reasonable. A further subjectivisation of the test of 
provocation is contained in the recommendation that the jury 
be al 1 owed to consider the facts as they appeared to the 
defendant. 
Prevezer (232] argues that the above recommendations, which 
have not yet been implemented, do not provide a true solution 
to the difficulties inherent in the 'reasonable man' test, 
since their implementation would result in the creation of a 
new body of case law relating to what can reasonably afford a 
sufficient ground for loss of self-control, comparable to that 
which related to the qualities of the 'reasonable man'·. 
Problems similar to those pertaining to the 'reasonable man' 
test would thus emerge. 
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3.3 A Synopsis of the English Law of Provocation 
In the light of the above discussion it can be concluded that 
the English law of provocation reflects a policy-based 
approach. Provocation is considered to be a separate doctrine 
governed by its own set of rules. A defence of provocation is 
only available on a charge of murder and, if successful, wil 1 
result in a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act [233] has retained the 
requirement that the provocation must have resulted in an 
actual loss of self-control on the part of the accused. This 
requirement is assessed subjectively, and al 1 factors which may 
throw light upon the accused's state of mind are considered to 
be judicially relevant. 
Section 3 of the above Act requires further that the 
provocative conduct was enough to make a 'reasonable man' do 
as the accused did. The standard of the 'reasonable man' is 
essentially objective but has, to some degree, become 
individualised. 
In Camplin [234], the House of Lords qualified the proposition 
adopted in Bedder [235] that any unusual physical 
characteristics of an accused are irrelevant to an analysis of 
the 'reasonable man' . On the authority of Camp 1 in, the 
'reasonable man' will acquire the age and.sex of an accused. 
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The decision in Camplin supports the view that the 'reasonable 
man' may acquire other personal characteristics of an accused 
such as his race or physical infirmities. It appears, however, 
that such characteristics will only be relevant where a direct 
connection exists between them and the provocation, e.g. where 
a taunt or insult relates directly to them. This approach is 




A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND 
THE ENGLISH LAW OF PROVOCATION 
Van Niekerk [238] argues that, in addressing the question of 
the relevance of provocation to criminal liability, the law is 
faced with two opposing considerations. On the one hand, there 
is the legitimate demand on.the part of an accused that justice 
must be meted out in a way which takes into account all the 
circumstances which may throw light on his conduct. On the 
other hand, there is the demand that, in the interests of 
' 
society at large, a person should control his emotions even 
when provoked. 
In the light of the discussion above on the English law of 
provocation, it is stibmitted that English law places an 
emphasis upon the latter consideration. This emphasis is 
clearly reflected in the essentially objective standard of the 
'reasonable man' against which the conduct of a provoked person 
is assessed. It has been pointed out that, despite a process 
of subjectivisation, this test precludes a consideration of 
personal characteristics of an accused such as mental 
deficiency, hot-headedness or excitability. 
rrn my view, the application of such an objective standard may 
1 ead to injustice, especial 1 y in a heterogenous and diversified 
' I cornrnun1 ty such as ours, which is characterised by a great 
variation in the development and sophistication of its people. 
~a 
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Many of the arguments which have been raised against the 
objective test of negligence followed in our law (239] are 
also applicable to the objective standard of the 'reasonable 
man' embodied ins 3 of the Homicide Act. 
In an attempt to address some of these concerns, the English 
courts have held that the 'reasonable man' may acquire some of 
the characteristics of the accused. It has been demonstrated 
above, however, that this process of individualisation has 
created some insoluble problems and has resulted in a number 
of fine and unworkable distinctions as to which characteristics 
may be relevant in this regard. 
It is submitted that some of the difficulties faced by the 
English courts in the implementation of the 'reasonable man' 
test flow from an attempt to strike a balance between treating 
the individual fairly and enforcing proper standards. Thus, 
a persori~who kills in response to provocation is considered to 
be less blameworthy than one who kills in cold blood, but not 
free from blame. [ 240] 
The above approach is reflected in the arguments by some South 
African writers that the subjective approach adopted in South 
African law on the issue of provocation leans too far in the 
direction of treating the individual fairly, thus compromising 
the enforcement of the law as a standard applicable to 
everybody in society. Some of these arguments have been 
discussed above in the context of a general defence of non-
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imputability. [241] 
It may be questioned, however, whether there are any compelling 
reasons why, in provocation cases, the community good requires 
a compromise of the fair treatment of an individual. As 
Burchell and Hunt [242] point out, the purpose of the criminal 
law is the infliction of punishment. The question whether a 
person who kills in response to provocation ought to be 
punished may thus be considered against an analysis of some of 
the theories of punishment. 
One of the most significant theories of punishment is that of 
general deterrence. In terms of this theory, the object of 
punishment is to punish an offender in such a way that others, 
through fear of receiving a like punishment, will refrain from 
committing a similar crime. Burchell and Hunt [243] point out 
that the underlying premise of this theory is that humans are 
rational beings who always think before acting, and thus base 
their conduct on a careful calculation of the gains and losses 
involved. 
In my view, it cannot be said of an accused who acts 
involuntarily or without imputability or intention, that his 
conduct is calculated or rational. It is thus submitted that 
the punishment of such a person cannot have a deterrent effect. 
According to the retribution theory, the punishment inflicted 
on an offender is justified on the ground that it is 
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'deserved'. This implies that the accused was free to choose 
his conduct and that he was able to act in accordance with the 
law. [244] In my view, the punishment of a person who behaves 
involuntarily or without imputability or intention as a result 
of provocation cannot be justified in terms of the retribution 
theory, since it cannot be said that he was free to choose his 
conduct or that he was able to act in accordance with the law. 
It is submitted further that the punishment of persons who 
kills in response to provocation will not necessarily have a 
reformative effect. Snyman (245] argues that punishment may 
only have this effect where an accused is aware of the 
unlawfulness of his conduct. There can be no such awareness 
where an accused acts involuntarily or where he lacks the 
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, or where he 
does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 
In the 1 ight of the above discussion, I submit that the 
strongly subjective, systematic and principle-based approach 
to provocation adopted in South African law is to be preferred 
to the objective, policy-based approach followed in England. 
In my view, the interests of criminal justice are not served 
by punishing a person who acts involuntarily, without 




By declaring s 141 of the Native Territories Penal Code to be 
an accurate reflection of the South African law of provocation, 
the Appellate Division in Butelezi established a policy-based 
approach to provocation in our 1 aw. Provocation was considered 
to be a separate doctrine, governed by its own set of rules. 
The application of the doctrine of specific intent meant that 
provocation could not operate as a complete defence but would 
reduce the crime of murder to culpable homicide. 
Starting in the 1950 's, however, the South African courts 
started to steer our law in the direction of a principle-based 
approach to criminal 1 iabi 1 i ty. Provocation began to be viewed 
as factual material to which the principles of criminal 
liability were to be applied. This approach is strongly 
reflected in S v Chretien where Rumpf£ CJ adopted the view 
that intoxication could negate the voluntariness of conduct, 
imputability or intention. Further, the court rejected the 
specific intent doctrine in the context of intoxication. 
The decision in Chretien had a marked influence on our law 
relating to provocation. In Arnold, the accused was acquitted 
on the basis of the court's finding that, as a result of 
provocation, he had not performed an "act in the legal sense". 
Al though the decision in this case has been criticised by 
Snyman, as wel 1 as El 1 is, it indicates that our courts are 
72 
prepared to find that provocation may negative voluntary 
conduct. 
The decision in Chretien paved the way for the recognition of 
a general defence of non-imputability in terms of which any 1 
non-pathological factor, including anger or emotional stress, 
which negatives the capacity of an actor to distinguish between 
right and wrong or the capacity to act accordingly, will lead 
to an acquittal. The existence of such a defence, which was 
accepted in principle in a number of Appellate Division 
decisions, was firmly established in our law in Wiid. Some of 
the arguments against al 1 owing such a defence have been 
considered, and it has been submitted that the recognition of 
such a general defence is in accordance with the principle-
based approach to criminal 1 aw now being foll owed by our 
courts. 
It has been shown that provocation may be relevant to the 
question whether intention is present. Since the decision in 
Mokonto, there is no doubt that this question is subjectively 
considered. It has been submitted that, in the light of th~ 
decision in Chretien, the specific intent doctrine no longer 
applies in our law. Thus, where provocation negatives an 
intention to murder, an accused will be found not guilty on 
that charge. A verdict of culpable homicide will not 
automatically follow, but will depend upon proof of negligence. 
It has been argued that, in terms of the objective test of 
73 
neg 1 i gence app 1 i ed by 
' 
our courts, it is unlikely that a 
provoked homicide will ever be considered to be reasonable. 
The objective standard, of negligence has been criticised, 
however, and it has been submitted that the interests of 
criminal justice would be better served by a purely subjective 
test, of negligence such as the test proposed by De Wet and 
Swanepoel. 
It has been argued that, in principle, provocation may operate 
as a justification ground. However, it is unlikely that a 
provoked ki 11 ing wi 11 be considered by our courts to be 
objectively reasonable. 
It can be concluded that our law has reached the point where 
provocation is considered to be merely part of the factual 
material to which the ordinary principles of criminal 1 iabi 1 i ty 
are to be applied. In principle, provocation may now be 
relevant to any element of criminal liability. 
In contrast to the above approach, the English law of 
provocation is strongly policy-based. A defence of provocation 
is only available on a charge of murder, and may only operate 
as a partial defence by reducing that crime to voluntary 
manslaughter. It has been demonstrated that the concept of the 
'reasonable man' test is problematic, and that the courts have 
grappled with the question as to which characteristics of an 
accused are relevant to the determination of the 'reasonable 
man'. The courts have allowed some personal characteristics 
74 
of an accused to be relevant in this regard. However, this 
approach has given rise to a number of fine and unworkable 
distinctions. 
The relative merits of the South African and the English 
approaches to provocation have been considered briefly. It has 
been submitted that, in the light of some of the theories of 
punishment, there are no compelling reasons why a person who 
kills in response to provocation ought not, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, to be allowed to escape punishment 
completely. For this reason, it is submitted that the policy-
based approach in English law in terms of which provocation may 
never operate as a complete defence, must be rejected. 
In conclusion, it has been submitted that the subjective, 
principle-based approach to criminal law foll owed in South 
Africa is preferable to the objective, policy-based approach 
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